Monetary Policy with Very Low Inflation in the Pacific Rim, NBER-EASE, Volume 15 by Dongchul Cho
This PDF is a selection from a published volume from the
National Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: Monetary Policy under Very Low Inflation
in the Pacific Rim, NBER-EASE, Volume 15
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Andrew K. Rose,
editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-37897-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_06-1
Conference Date: June 25-27, 2004
Publication Date: September 2006
Title: Interest Rate, Inflation, and Housing Price: With an
Emphasis on Chonsei Price in Korea
Author: Dongchul Cho,
URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c101479.1 Introduction
Since the IT bubble burst in 2000, interest rates have fallen and housing
prices have risen in the global economy. According to Case and Shiller
(2003), for example, the ratio of house prices to per capita income soared
from around 6.5 in 2000 to around 8.5 in 2003 in California. Along with the
soaring house prices, investment on house construction also increased at a
substantial pace. For example, the residential investment in the United
States increased by 4.9 percent in 2002 and 7.5 percent in 2003, while gross
domestic product (GDP) grew at the rate of 2.2 percent in 2002 and 3.1
percent in 2003.
Korea was no exception in this global trend. During the period from
2001 to 2003, the general house price index rose by more than 30 percent.
However, the prices of apartments—the most preferred housing type in re-
cent years—rose by more than 50 percent nationwide, and by almost 100
percent in the Kangnam area (south of Han River) of Seoul. Along with
the rise in house prices, construction industries enjoyed a boom. The aver-
age annual growth rate of building construction investment during the
period of 2001–2003 reached 13.3 percent, while the average GDP growth
rate remained only at 4.6 percent. This boom increased the portion of
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In addition to all of these standard indicators, however, the Korean
housing market has a unique chonsei system that provides a very meaning-
ful indicator for the market value of housing service—chonsei price, or an
up-front lump-sum deposit from the tenant to the owner for the use of the
property with no additional requirement for periodic rent payments (see
section 9.2 for details). While chonsei prices, as well as sales prices, should
reﬂect demand and supply in the housing market, the two prices have
shown sharply diﬀerent trends since the second half of 2002 (see ﬁgure 9.1).
Until the ﬁrst half of 2002, both prices had rapidly recovered from the col-
lapse after the 1997 crisis. Since then, however, only the sales prices have
kept rising while the chonsei prices have stagnated, which has sharply
raised the ratio of sales to chonsei price or lowered the real value of chonsei
deposit (deﬂated by the sales price). This phenomenon can, in a sense, be
interpreted as a transfer of wealth from chonsei tenants to house owners.
Motivated by this observation, this chapter examines the determinants
of the relative housing prices—sales and chonsei prices—and shows that
the relative housing prices depend on the ratio of nominal to real interest
rate. It is probably easy to expect that the discrepancy between the two
housing prices is widened as the (expected) inﬂation rate increases. At the
same time, however, the discrepancy can also be widened when the real in-
terest rate declines, even though the monetary authority adamantly sticks
to a pre-announced inﬂation target. In fact, this argument applies not only
to the housing prices, but also to the prices of general nominal assets that
are not hedged against inﬂation.
If the monetary authority has concerns over the potential wealth trans-
fers due to the decline in real interest rate, it could, at least in theory, main-
tain the relative housing prices (or relative prices of real to nominal assets)
by proportionately adjusting the target level of inﬂation rate to the decline
of the real interest rate.1 This result may ﬁnd its relevancy to an economy
like Korea’s, in which real interest rates are secularly declining and the
credit market is not yet completely accessible to households (see sections
9.2 and 9.5).
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 9.2 explains the chonseisys-
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1. The recent volatility in asset prices under the stable and low inﬂation environment has
triggered a challenge on the standard inﬂation-targeting framework. While a majority of
economists (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 2001; Gilchrist and Leahy 2002) still support the stan-
dard monetary-policy framework represented by Taylor rules, a group of economists (e.g.,
Cecchetti et al. 2000; Borio and Lowe 2002; Hahm and Hong 2002) argue that the monetary
authority needs to react to asset-price bubbles in order to stabilize the economy. See Bean
(2003) for this debate. Although from a quite diﬀerent perspective, this chapter’s result could
be interpreted to provide a rationale for the monetary policy that considers asset-price ﬂuc-
tuations.tem of Korea and section 9.3 contains a theoretical model that explains the
determination of housing prices. The ﬁrst part of section 9.3 discusses the
arbitrage condition between the sales and chonsei prices, and the second
part presents a simple general-equilibrium growth model that includes
housing sector. Section 9.4 presents the results of a crude empirical anal-
ysis on the ratio of sales to chonsei prices in Korea, and section 9.5 con-
cludes with brief remarks about monetary policy.
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Fig. 9.1 A, trends of house prices; B, trends of chonsei prices9.2 Chonsei System in Korea
The Korean housing market has a very unique system called chonsei. In
this system, the tenant pays an up-front lump-sum amount of deposit (cur-
rently 30 to 70 percent of house sales prices) to the owner for the use of the
property with no additional requirement for periodic rent payments. The
interest earned on this lump-sum deposit, therefore, provides income to the
owner during the contract period (typically two years), and the deposit is
returned to the tenant when the contract expires. If the owner does not re-
turn the chonseideposit at maturity, the Korean legal system grants the ten-
ant priority to recoup the deposit from an auction for the house arranged
by the court. That is, the tenant’s deposit is legally protected as an asset that
can be claimed against the collateral value of the property.
Although the historical origin of the chonsei system is not entirely clear,
the literature reports that a convention similar to the chonseisystem already
existed in Korea during the Chosun Dynasty (or Yi Dynasty, 1392–1910).2
In particular, this system was widely spread out in Seoul, where people
rushed in as the feudal system collapsed after the Byung-Ja Treaty (1876)
between Korea and Japan. While the court recognized the chonseisystem as
a convention during the Japanese colonial period (1910–1945), the ﬁrst Ko-
rean government, in 1948, began to formally recognize the chonsei system
under the legal framework. The legal rights and obligations of the home-
owners and tenants have slightly changed over time, but the deposit has
been protected if legally registered. Nevertheless, the chonsei contract dif-
fers from a collateral contract in that the tenant does not assume the own-
ership of the property even if the homeowner defaults on the deposit.
Underdeveloped ﬁnancial services (mortgage services in particular) and
rapid urbanization are thought to be the two most important factors that
explain the popularity of the chonsei system in Korea.3 During the period
of “government-led development,” in particular, the Korean government
kept interest rates low for business ﬁrms. These interventions inevitably im-
posed higher-than-equilibrium interest rates on consumer credit and hous-
ing ﬁnance in the formal ﬁnancial market. Under this environment, “for
landlords, chonsei is an informal ﬁnancial instrument that satisﬁes various
household credit demands....  F o r  t e nants, the chonsei system allows
households to aﬀord homes that would not be possible for outright cash
purchase” (Ambrose and Kim 2003, 62).
This chonsei system has been widely spread out with the rapid urbani-
zation for the last few decades in Korea.4 According to the Population and
Housing Census Report (National Statistics Oﬃce 2000), the total number
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2. For example, Kim (2000) and Park (2000) cite the survey reports on Korean conventions
prepared by the Japanese Colonial Government (1910–1945).
3. See for example Renaud (1989) and Choi (2003).
4. See Ambrose and Kim (2003) for details.of households in Korea is 14.31 million, out of which 7.75 million (54 per-
cent) are homeowners and 4.04 million (28 percent) are under chonseicon-
tracts (the remaining households are under monthly rents). In particular,
the ratio of chonsei tenants increases in metropolitan areas, where housing
prices are high. For example, the number of chonsei tenants is as large as
the number of homeowners in Seoul (out of 3.09 million households, 1.26
million [40 percent] are homeowners and 1.27 million [40 percent] are un-
der chonsei contracts).
Given the popularity of the chonsei system, it is obvious that a substan-
tial amount of assets are held in the form of chonsei deposit in Korea. For
example, a back-of-the-envelop calculation yields 200 to 250 trillion won,
approximately 40 percent of GDP or 80 percent of the total stock value, as
the outstanding amount of total chonsei deposit.5 Given this size of the
chonsei deposit, it seems natural that policymakers are concerned about
the ﬂuctuation of chonsei prices.6 More important than the chonsei prices
themselves, however, may be the ratio of sales to chonsei prices. This ratio
is often interpreted as an indicator for the aﬀordability of potential home-
buyers because relatively young and/or poor households commonly live
under chonseicontracts until they accumulate suﬃcient savings in addition
to the chonsei deposit for the purchase of their own houses.7 As an extreme
example, if 100 percent of chonsei deposit is held for future purchase of
houses, then a 1 percent increase of sales price over chonseiprice simply im-
plies a 1 percent decline in the purchasing power of chonsei deposit.
Apart from the policymakers’ concerns, the information about chonsei
prices is potentially very useful in identifying the factors that aﬀect asset
prices of real estate. Unlike the sales price, the chonsei price inherently ex-
cludes the possibility of capital gains and reﬂects the value of housing ser-
vice assessed by the spot housing market itself. In this sense, the Korean
housing market provides an important additional indicator for the real
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5. According to the 1997 National Wealth Survey,the total value of household housing (ex-
cluding land) is 485 trillion won, which is approximately 50 percent of the total building value
of all sectors. Applying this ratio of 50 percent to the total land value estimate, 1,548 trillion
won, yields 1,259 (  774   485) trillion won as the total value of housing (including land).
Using 28 percent as the ratio of chonseidwellings and 60 percent as the ratio of chonseito sales
prices, one can obtain 212 trillion won in 1997, which is estimated to inﬂate to 284 trillion won
as of the end of 2003, applying the chonsei price index. This amount is almost 40 percent of
GDP (721 trillion won) or 80 percent of total equity value (355 trillion won) in 2003.
6. While many chonsei contracts are revolved upon maturity, the related parties write new
contracts whose prices reﬂect market situations at that time. Therefore, new contracts involve
cash transactions between owners and chonsei tenants, whenever chonsei prices change in the
market. With general price inﬂation, it is common for tenants to deposit additional money
that covers the increments in chonsei prices, but there were some exceptional cases. For ex-
ample, housing prices including chonsei prices were collapsed by more than 20 percent na-
tionwide in the swirl of economic crisis in 1998, which pushed many owners to the verge of
liquidity crisis and invited the government to mobilize special rescue funds for them.
7. For the stylized facts of housing tenures and demography, see Renaud (1989) and Choi
(2003).estate prices, which are not available in other countries. The next section
considers various factors that explain the discrepancy between the sales
price and chonsei price, but the emphasis will be given to the expected cap-
ital gains that are greatly inﬂuenced by macrovariables, such as interest and
inﬂation rates, rather than other micro or institutional factors.
9.3 Theoretical Discussion
9.3.1 Interest Rate, Inﬂation Rate, and Real Estate Prices
Chonsei versus Purchase
A household in Korea having two choices for housing service, either
purchase or chonsei, would consider the following factors. First, there are
inherent diﬀerences between homeowners and chonsei tenants. For ex-
ample, the homeowners are free to move whenever they want, while the
chonseitenants do not enjoy such a freedom. This is a factor that boosts the
sales price relative to chonsei price. In contrast, however, the homeowners
should bear the cost to maintain the quality of houses that chonsei tenants
do not have to care about. This is a factor that discounts the sales price rel-
ative to chonsei price. A priori, therefore, it is not clear whether the sales
price should be inherently higher than the chonsei price.
Second, the homeowners should bear the risk of price ﬂuctuations, while
the chonsei tenants are relatively well-protected from such risks. As far as
investors are risk averse, this is a factor that discounts the sales price rela-
tive to chonsei price. Third, the homeowners should pay taxes that chonsei
tenants are free from.8 This is another factor that discounts the sales price
relative to chonsei price. In short, these factors cannot explain why sales
prices are substantially higher than chonsei prices for the basically same
housing services.
Therefore, the primary reason for the huge discrepancy of the sales price
relative to chonseiprice seems to lie in the expectation on capital gain. That
is, the chonsei tenants are expected to recoup only the deposit in monetary
unit upon maturity, but the owners will be able to enjoy capital gains if the
house prices rise as they did in Korea. As with any other prices in mone-
tary economy, the rise of house price is composed of two parts, the rise in
the relative price of house over general prices and the rise of general prices
(or inﬂation) itself. However, the rise of relative price can hardly be sus-
tained in the long run, and thus this chapter focuses on the general price in-
ﬂation as the underlying factor that persistently increases house price.9For
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8. Section 9.4 provides explanation on Korea’s real estate tax system.
9. Theoretically, it is possible that the relative prices of houses keep rising at a more rapid
rate than general prices if the productivity growth rate of the housing sector is permanently
lower than other sectors. However, this does not seem to be the case at least in Korea duringthe same reason, the general price inﬂation can be seen as a primary factor
for the sales price that remains substantially higher than chonsei price all
the time.
An Arbitrage Condition
Focusing on the aforementioned factor of expected capital gain, the ar-
bitrage condition between the sales and chonsei prices can be written as
(1) Pt
H   ,
where Pt
H is sales price at time t, Pt
C is chonsei price, it is nominal interest
rate, Et(PH
t 1) is the sales price at time t   1 expected at time t. That is, the
sales price at time tis the discounted sum of the return for housing services
(or the opportunity cost of dwelling in the house rather than leasing the
house on a chonsei contract), itPt
C, and the expected sales price at time t 1,
Et(PH
t 1).
This arbitrage condition can be recursively solved forward, and the so-
lution will be a complicated function of the expectations about future
chonsei prices and interest rates. Assuming a steady state with no specula-
tive bubbles (in which the interest rate is ﬁxed at i and the chonsei price in-
creases at a constant inﬂation rate of  ), however, equation (1) produces a
simple and intuitive result:
(2)   .
That is, the ratio of the sales to chonsei price is equal to the ratio of nomi-
nal to real interest rate. Of course, this result is based on many restrictive
assumptions. Nevertheless, if the sustained real interest rate is around 4
percent and chonsei price inﬂation rate is around 3 percent (a medium-
term target inﬂation rate of the monetary authority in Korea), this ratio be-
comes 1.75, which is similar to the ratio of sales to chonsei price at the end
of 2003.10
Financial versus Real Asset Prices
It has long been recognized that the existence of inﬂation raises the value
of real assets relative to ﬁnancial assets that are not hedged against inﬂa-
tion risks. In Korea, the discrepancy between the sales and chonsei prices
for the same housing can be referred to as a typical example for this. In fact,
i
 







C   Et(PH
t 1)]
  
(1   it)
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the 1987–2003 period: the overall housing price increased at 4.1 percent per annum, slightly
lower than the CPI inﬂation rate of 5.0 percent, although the average apartment price in-
creased at 6.9 percent, slightly higher than the CPI inﬂation rate.
10. The ratio of sales to chonsei prices of apartments at the end of 2003 was 1.7 for the na-
tion and 2.0 for Seoul (Kookmin Bank 2004).the above result can be applied to rather general asset prices. In a steady
state economy where the nominal interest rate is ﬁxed at i, the price of a
ﬁnancial asset that yields a constant return R in monetary unit at every
point in time is determined by ∫0
  e–isRds   R/i, while the price of a real as-
set that provides service ﬂow whose price increases at a constant inﬂation
rate   can be expressed as ∫0
  e–isRe sds   R/(i –  ). Therefore, the existence
of inﬂation pushes up the price of a real asset relative to that of ﬁnancial
asset providing the same service, and their ratio becomes the same as the
sales to chonsei prices Pt
H/Pt
C   i/(i –  ).11
From this result, it is easily conﬁrmed that a rise in the inﬂation rate
would raise the price of real asset relative to that of ﬁnancial asset. What
has not been much discussed in the literature, however, is that the same
eﬀect can be generated by the decline of real interest rate. Deﬁning the real
interest rate as r   i –  , equation (2) can be re-expressed as Pt
H/Pt
C   1  
 /r, implying that the relative price is determined by the ratio of inﬂation
rate to real interest rate, rather than by the inﬂation rate alone. Therefore,
even when the monetary authority strictly maintains a pre-announced tar-
get level of inﬂation rate, the ratio of sales to chonsei price rises if the real
interest rate is lowered.
In order to relate this discussion to monetary policy, however, it seems
necessary to explicitly understand the general price level. In other words,
the meaning of “real estate price” or “chonsei price” rather than the rela-
tive price of those two needs to be clariﬁed in the context of general price
inﬂation. At the same time, if the discussion is extended from the housing
market to the macroeconomy, the real interest rate and rent need to be
taken as endogenous variables. In this sense, this subsection’s discussion is
viewed as a partial equilibrium approach in which inﬂation rate, real inter-
est rate, and rent are exogenously determined. In order to sense a general
equilibrium ﬂavor, the next subsection will examine a very simple growth
model.
9.3.2 A Simple Growth Model
Consider a representative household who earns (nominal) income itAt
from asset At and spends P tCt and RtHt for consumption Ct and housing
service Ht, respectively. If the instantaneous utility function is given by
ln(Ct
 Ht
1– ) and the time discount rate is  , then the household solves the
following optimization problem:





1  ) e ptdt, s.t. A ˙
t   itAt   P tCt   RtHt,
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11. The sales to chonseiprice ratio can also be considered in this context. The prices of chon-
sei and sales are P0
C   ∫t
0 e–isRsds   P0
Ce–it and P0
H   ∫t
0 e–isRsds   Pt
H e–it, respectively. The main
diﬀerence between the two prices is that, at time t, chonsei renters are left with the chonsei de-
posit at time zero, while the owners are left with the house price at time t (Pt
H   P0
He ). Com-
paring the two prices, one can derive P0
H/P0
C   (1 – e–it)/(1 – e–[i– ]t)   i/(i –  ).where A ˙
tdenotes the increase in the asset level. If the (nominal) value of the
asset is the sum of (nominal) values of capital and houses,
(4) At   Pt
KKt   Pt
HHt,
it is easy to show that the growth rate of consumption as well as capital be-




(5)    it      .
Production and Capital Market Eﬃciencies
In this economy with no frictions, where real and nominal variables can
be completely separated, the relative prices of real assets to consumption
goods are entirely determined by the supply side, or the technology that
stipulates how many units of real assets are accumulated at the expense of
one unit sacriﬁce of consumption. In order to make this point clear, assume
the following technology:
(6) K ˙
t   H ˙
t   D(BKt   Ct).
For simplicity, this equation takes a linear-production function BKt and
treats capital and house as perfect substitutes at the supply side. A peculiar
feature in this equation is the coeﬃcient 0   D   1 that measures the units
of increase in future capital when present consumption is reduced by one
unit. While D   1 is the standard case in growth models, the case of D   1
can be interpreted in line with a Tobin’s qmodel in the sense that D 1 im-
plies a real adjustment cost in investment.12 Another, perhaps more perti-
nent, interpretation of D may be the degree of capital-market eﬃciency. In
other words, if the capital-market eﬃciency is low, or D   1, then the cap-
ital-accumulation process is marred although the production eﬃciency B
is maintained.
Once the model is set up as above, it is easy to derive the equilibrium rel-
ative prices by equating the resource constraint (equation [6]) and the bud-
get constraint (equations [3] and [4]). That is, using equations (3) and (4),
(7) P ˙
t
KKt   Pt
KK ˙




t   it(Pt
KKt   Pt
HHt)   P tCt   RtHt
is derived, and by equating this equation to equation (6), one can obtain the
following four equilibrium conditions:
(8-1)   D ⇒ Pt
K   ;
P t  
D
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12. Of course, while the adjustment cost vanishes when the economy approaches a steady
state in Tobin’s q models, equation (6) assumes that the cost exists permanently for simplicity.
See Abel and Blanchard (1983) and Lim and Weil (2003) for growth models that explicitly in-
corporate formal Tobin’s q speciﬁcations.(8-2)   1 ⇒ Pt
H   Pt
K;
(8-3)   DB;
(8-4)   0 ⇒   ⇒  Rt   BP t.
These results are easily predictable from the assumptions. That is, results
(8-1) and (8-2) state that the relative price of capital (or house) to con-
sumption good is determined by D, while result (8-3) indicates that the real
interest rate is determined by Bmultiplied by D, or the eﬃciency of the cap-
ital transformation process from present to the future. Result (8-4) is an
arbitrage condition that the beneﬁt from the purchase of house, the sum of
rent Rt and capital gain P ˙
t
H, should be equal to the opportunity cost, itPt
H.
Inﬂation and Chonsei Price
The introduction of money in this model economy does not aﬀect any
relative prices, hence any resource allocation processes. Therefore, if the
monetary authority inﬂates a certain target price, say, consumption price
P t, at a rate of  , the asset prices will increase at the same rate. In contrast,
however, the rate of inﬂation can aﬀect the relative price of chonsei. As far
as an arbitrage condition holds between the chonsei and rent markets, the
opportunity cost of chonsei, itPt
C, should be equal to the rent:
(9) Pt
C    .
Price Responses to a Decline in Real Interest Rate
What would happen to this economy if the real interest rate permanently
declines? First, the growth rate is unambiguously lowered (equation [5]).
The relative prices of assets to consumption goods, however, depend on the
sources of the decline in interest rate. If the real interest rate is lowered due
to the decline in B, then the relative price of house (or capital) does not
change (equation [8-1]), and only the relative price of chonseideclines (equa-
tion [9]). If, in contrast, the real interest rate is lowered due to the decline in
D, then both the house (or capital) and chonsei prices rise, but the price of
house rises more than that of chonsei. Figure 9.2 describes this situation.
The intuition that the decline in B does not change the relative price of
house can be explained as follows. The price of house is ultimately deter-
mined by PH   ∫0
  e–(i– )sRds   R/(i –  ), and thus the fall in the real inter-
est rate itself is a factor to raise the house price by lowering the discount
BP t   































350 Dongchul Chorate for the future (or the return rate of alternative investment). In a gen-
eral equilibrium set-up, however, the rent R is also lowered by the decline
in B because consumption goods supplied by the same amount of capital
are decreased while the supply of houses remains at the same level. In the
particular model of this subsection, the instantaneous fall in Rexactly can-
cels oﬀthe eﬀect from the decline in the real interest rate, leaving the house
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Fig. 9.2 Time paths of house price (Pt
H) and chonsei price (Pt
C)price unchanged.13In contrast, if the real interest rate is lowered due to the
decline in D, the supply of consumption goods and R do not change, rais-
ing the house price.
Price Index and the Target Rate of Inﬂation
In the previous paragraphs, it was shown that the house price does not
change if the real interest rate declines due to a fall in B. Yet it is worthwhile
to note that the house price here was the relative price of house to con-
sumption goods. In other words, this “price” becomes the price in mone-
tary unit, only when the monetary authority uses the price of consumption
goods as a target. In practice, however, it seems common to include rent as
an important component of the target Consumer Price Index (CPI).14 If,
for example, the monetary authority gradually increases the price index,
(10) qt   Pt
 Rt
1  
(instead of P t), then the price of housing (as well as P t) in monetary unit will
rise even when a fall in B lowers the real interest rate (see ﬁgure 9.2 for the
time paths of the housing prices in this case).
Although the chonseiprice in monetary unit is also aﬀected by the choice
of target price as well as the source of the decline in real interest rate, the
ratio of sales to chonsei prices depends only on the inﬂation rate as con-
ﬁrmed in the previous subsection. Therefore, if the monetary authority
lowers the target inﬂation rate proportionately in response to the decline in
the real interest rate, the discrepancy of the chonsei price from the sales
price would not be expanded. Figure 9.2 also shows the time paths of hous-
ing prices when the monetary authority follows such a rule.
Quantity Responses to a Decline in Real Interest Rate
Though not a central issue in this paper, the responses of the quantity
variables with respect to a decline in the real interest rate can also be traced
(see the appendix for algebra). One of the results worth noting is that a fall
in the real interest rate lowers the ratio of consumption to housing at the
steady state, but raises the ratio of consumption to capital.
It is natural to decrease the steady-state level of capital to housing ratio
as the real interest rate (or the marginal rate of return for capital) declines
due to a fall in B, because the shock that lowers the marginal rate of return
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13. In this case, the relative price of capital to consumption good does not change, but the
shadow price of capital (as well as consumption good) jumps up. That is, an unanticipated ad-
verse shock to productivity decreases the level of consumption, and the ex post marginal util-
ity of consumption good is higher than the marginal utility that was expected before the shock
was realized.
14. In Korea, the weight of rent is approximately 15 percent in the headline CPI that does
not include owner’s equivalent rent (www.nso.go.kr). If the owner’s equivalent rent was in-
cluded in the CPI, the weight of rent would be increased to approximately 31 percent, which
is similar to that in the United States at 31.5 percent (www.bls.gov).for capital does not directly lower the marginal utility from the housing ser-
vice.15 Therefore, the household reduces the saving for capital accumula-
tion (hence income), but not the saving for housing. This optimization be-
havior leads to a decrease in the steady-state level of consumption, but not
as much as the decrease in the steady-state level of capital. Recalling that
the measured income is a linear function of capital, this implies that the
steady-state saving rate in the aggregate falls when the real interest rate de-
clines. At the same time, however, the saving rate for housing investment
rises with a fall in the real interest rate or growth rate, which seems to be
consistent with the recent experiences of the global economy as mentioned
in the introduction.
Remarks
In order to learn intuitions in a straightforward way, this subsection in-
troduces a very simple growth model in which all of the prices are instan-
taneously adjusted from one steady state to another. This model may be ex-
tended in various dimensions to generate rich dynamics of asset prices. For
example, a Cobb-Douglas production function can be used instead of the
linear-production function of this subsection (results are available upon re-
quest). In this case, a fall in the eﬃciency growth rate gradually lowers the
real interest rate, and thus the discrepancy between the sales and chonsei
prices is also widened at a gradual pace. Another variant would be to ex-
plicitly introduce the Tobin’s qmodel, which would produce short-run ﬂuc-
tuations of asset prices. Perhaps the most interesting variation of the
model, however, might be the one in which housing rents adjust to ﬂuctu-
ations of interest rates in a gradual manner (probably due to a slow adjust-
ment of housing market relative to consumption goods market). This fea-
ture that relaxes the tight link between the housing and other markets
would be able to generate short-run deviations of rents from interest rates,
hence the ﬂuctuations of house prices.
9.4 A Brief Look at the Data
Interest Rate, Inﬂation Rate, and the Ratio of Sales to Chonsei Prices
Based on the theoretical discussion of the previous section, this section
takes a brief look at the actual data of the sales and chonseiprices of apart-
ments from Korea.16While it would also be of great interest to examine the
house prices in relation to general prices and macroeconomic ﬂuctuations,
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15. When the real interest rate declines due to a fall in D, the results become complicated.
See the appendix.
16. See appendix B for variable explanations and data sources. The data for house prices
were collected from the Kookmin Bank. This data set is an oﬃcial (or at least semi-oﬃcial)
one that the Korean government uses. Originally, this data set was compiled by the National
Bank for Housing, which was merged into the Kookmin Bank (then another governmentthe model’s predictions regarding these issues are not suﬃciently clear. At
the same time, it is very likely that various sector-speciﬁc shocks have gen-
erated uneven eﬀects across the housing market and other markets in ac-
tual data. This section, therefore, limits the scope of analysis to the relative
housing prices that are presumably immune to the noises generated by mi-
cro sector-speciﬁc shocks. In addition, considering that most theoretical
discussion was based on steady-state analyses, the empirical examination
is also focused on the relationships of long-run trends across variables.
Figure 9.3shows the trends of relevant variables since 1986, the ﬁrst year
of the available data, along with their HP-ﬁltered trends. First, the ratio of
sales to chonsei prices (ﬁgure 9.3A) had declined from almost three in the
late 1980s to around 1.5 in 2000, and rebounded back to two since then.
Second, apart from the exceptional hike during the currency crisis period
in 1998, the nominal interest rate (ﬁgure 9.3B) had also declined from over
15 percent in the early 1990s to around 6 percent in 2003. Third, however,
the expected inﬂation rate (ﬁgure 9.3C) had also been lowered from over 5
percent in the late 1980s to below 3 percent in 1998 and 1999, operating as
a factor to lower the ratio of sales to chonseiprices. Fourth, in contrast, the
portion of expected inﬂation in the nominal interest (ﬁgure 9.3D) has been
rising from below 20 percent in 1998 and 1999 to over 40 percent in 2003,
mainly due to the decline in the real interest rate in spite of stable inﬂation
expectations, which seems to operate as an important factor for the re-
bound of the housing price ratio.
Taxes on Real Estate
Although the inﬂation and interest rates seem to be capable of explain-
ing the direction of long-term trend of the housing price ratio, they are not
suﬃcient enough to explain the magnitudeof the changes in this ratio, par-
ticularly the ratio around three in the late 1980s and early 1990s. During
this period, the portion of the expected inﬂation rate in the nominal inter-
est rate was nearly 50 percent, implying that the inﬂation and interest rate
cannot generate the housing price ratio over two. This observation invites
discussions on the other factors explained in section 9.3 that can poten-
tially aﬀect this ratio. In order to incorporate the other factors, slightly
modify the arbitrage condition, equation (1):
(1 ) Pt
H   ,
[(it    )Pt
C    Pt
H   Et(PH
t 1)]
    
(1   it)
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bank) and privatized after the Korean crisis. This data set traces the prices of 16,000 sampled
houses throughout the whole country every month. For apartments, the sample size is 13,020
covering Seoul, six metropolitan areas, ﬁfty-six cities, four Goons (district unit in rural area),
and ninety Gus (district unit in urban area). Currently, the quality of the houses is not con-
sidered in this data set.Fig. 9.3 A, ratio of sales to chonsei prices; B, nominal versus real interest rates; 
C, expected inﬂation rate; D, expected inﬂation rate as a portion of nominal interest
rate; E, eﬀective tax rate on real estate; F, eﬀective tax rate relative to nominal
interest rate
where   is a tax rate for holding a house and   represents all the other fac-
tors, such as convenience for owning a house, maintenance cost, risk
averseness and so forth. The reason for separating out the tax rate from
other factors is that the changes in tax rate can be traced to an extent, while
the changes of other factors over time are neither traceable nor believed to
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A
Bbe signiﬁcant. Under the steady-state assumption again, equation (2) is
modiﬁed to be:
(2 )   .
The real estate tax system is extremely complicated in Korea: one should
pay acquisition and registration taxes when he or she purchases a house,
property tax while he or she holds a house, and capital gains tax when he
i   
  









Fig. 9.3 (cont.)or she sells a house. However, what makes the system complicated is how
to calculate the actual taxes. For example, the legal tax rates for acquisition
and registration are 2 percent and 3 percent, respectively, but the eﬀective
tax rates are far lower than the legal rates because the actual taxes are
based on “publicly assessed values” that are far lower than market prices.
Similarly, the property tax rate ranges from 0.2 percent to 7 percent pro-
gressively with property values, but the eﬀective tax rate is estimated to be
around 0.1 percent. The capital gains tax rate is 40–60 percent, but there
exist many exceptional cases for reductions and exemptions.
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Fig. 9.3 (cont.)Figures 9.3E and 9.3F show the estimated eﬀective tax rates on real es-
tate, or the total tax revenues divided by the estimates of total real estate
value. In light of equations (1 ) and (2 ), these statistics have two potential
shortcomings. First, since the relevant tax data for apartments are not
available, these ﬁgures report the eﬀective tax rates for the entire real estate
(including land and nonapartment houses). Second, since the portion of
property tax (or holding tax) in total real estate tax revenue is very low in
Korea relative to those in other countries, the ﬁgures report not only the
property tax rate but also the total tax rate, including taxes related to trans-
actions. However, it should be noted that the transaction-related taxes
must have theoretically diﬀerent eﬀects on real estate prices from those of
holding taxes.
In spite of the shortcomings, the ﬁgures provide some basic insights.
First, the eﬀective tax rate on real estate has been rising from a very low
level (ﬁgure 9.3E).17 In conjunction with the rapid decline of nominal in-
terest rate, the relative size of the eﬀective tax rate to the nominal interest
rate has been sharply increasing (ﬁgure 9.3F), implying that the tax factor
appears to have contributed to the decline in the ratio of sales to chonsei
prices. Second, however, the magnitude of the impact by tax seems to be
small relative to the impacts by interest rates and inﬂation rates: during the
sample period in ﬁgure 9.3, the eﬀective holding tax rate ﬂuctuates from
0.02 percent to 0.12 percent only (from 0.1 percent to 0.6 percent for the
entire tax rate), while the ﬂuctuations of interest rates and inﬂation rates
are in the order of several percentage points. This observation seems to em-
phasize the importance of macrovariables in determining the real estate
prices, although the macrovariables as well as taxes do not appear to suﬃ-
ciently explain the high sales price relative to chonsei price in the late
1980s.18
9.6 Conclusion with Some Remarks on Monetary Policy
This chapter discusses the relationship between interest rates and inﬂa-
tion rates on one part and the house prices (typical real asset prices) rela-
tive to chonsei prices (typical nominal asset prices) on the other. The key
point of the chapter is that the relative price of sales to chonsei depends on
the ratio of inﬂation to real interest rates. Therefore, even when the mone-
tary authority maintains a pre-announced target level of inﬂation rate, the
relative price of sales to chonsei rises if the real interest rate declines.
It is not clear whether the monetary authority shouldbe concerned about
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17. The eﬀective holding tax rate was merely 0.02 percent and even the entire tax revenue
was less than 0.1 percent of total real estate value in the late 1980s.
18. A strong conjecture among Koreans is that there were signiﬁcant bubbles in real estate
prices in the late 1980s, which has not been considered in this chapter.the changes in this ratio. At least, the growth model presented in this chap-
ter is completely silent on this issue: there exists neither short-run ﬂuctua-
tion nor social cost from inﬂation. Probably the answer should be sought
in the context of the debate about whether the monetary authority should
be concerned with the ﬂuctuations of asset prices in the ﬁrst place.19 In ad-
dition to its implication on short-run economic ﬂuctuations, however, the
changes in the relative housing price between sales and chonseigenerate sig-
niﬁcant implications about wealth distribution in Korea. As mentioned in
section 9.2, most of the chonsei deposit is the savings that relatively young
and/or poor people have reserved for the purchase of houses in the future.
Unless the capital market is perfect, therefore, a rise in the sales price rela-
tive to chonsei price is very likely to worsen the wealth distribution.
If the ﬂuctuations in interest rates and the induced ﬂuctuations in the rel-
ative house prices are cyclical, the implication about wealth distribution is
temporary. If the real interest rate (and growth rate) secularly declines,
however, it may permanently deteriorate the wealth distribution. In fact,
the secular decline in capital productivity and real interest rates is a likely
scenario in developing economies like Korea, although it may not be com-
mon in developed economies.20 Figure 9.4, copied from Cho and Koh
(1999), clearly shows the long-term declining trends of capital productiv-
ity and real interest rates in Korea for the past thirty years. In this case, the
monetary authority can at least in theory prevent such an “undesirable”
deterioration of wealth distribution by lowering the target inﬂation rate in
proportion to the decline in real interest rate.
In practice, of course, it is extremely diﬃcult to identify the components
of short-term ﬂuctuation, as opposed to secular components, from the
variations of real interest rates. Given the widespread apprehension about
the zero (nominal) interest rate bound, in addition, a more serious question
may be how much to lower the target inﬂation rate in an economy with very
low interest rates. That is, as the real interest rate declines toward zero, the
monetary authority may have to accept either a higher discrepancy between
real and ﬁnancial-asset values or a higher risk of hitting the zero interest
rate bound. Regarding many issues, including this thought-provoking one,
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19. The recent volatility in asset prices under the stable and low inﬂation environment has
triggered a challenge on the standard inﬂation-targeting framework. While a majority of
economists (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 2001; Gilchrist and Leahy 2002) still support the stan-
dard monetary-policy framework represented by Taylor rules, a group of economists (e.g.,
Cecchetti et al. 2000; Borio and Lowe 2002; Hahm and Hong 2003) argue that the monetary
authority needs to react to asset-price bubbles in order to stabilize the economy. See Bean
(2003) for this debate. Although from a quite diﬀerent perspective, this chapter’s result could
be interpreted to provide a rationale for the monetary policy that considers asset-price ﬂuc-
tuations.
20. The convergence theory based on either the Neoclassical growth model (Barro 1991;
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992) or technology diﬀusion (Lucas 2000; Parente and Prescott
1994) predicts a secular decline of (capital) productivity growth rate and real interest rate.the chapter does not provide rigorous discussions yet, and many argu-
ments remain at conjecture levels. No doubt that far more research is
needed before drawing conclusions in this area.
Appendix A
Dynamics of the Model in the Text
The dynamics of the model in the text can be traced by solving the follow-
ing three equations for Ct, Ht, and Kt:
(5)    it        r t    DB    ;
(6) K ˙
t   H ˙
t   D(BKt   Ct);
Ct    Ht   r tHt   DBHt,
from the optimization of instantaneous allocation between consumption
and housing expenditure. While Ct and Ht always move along the steady-
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Fig. 9.4 Trends of real interest rates of Korea
Source: Cho and Koh (1999).state paths (although the steady-state level of Ct can jump at the moment
when a shock arrives), Kt has a transitional dynamics governed by:
  DB   [(DB    )   D2B].
In a steady state, therefore, these three equations yield:
  DB;
   (DB    )   D2B ; hence,
    (DB    )   D2B .
Using these results, it can be shown that a fall in either Bor Ddecreases the
steady-state values of C/H, K/H, and K/C. Finally, the aggregate saving rate
at the steady state,
1    1    ,
declines with a fall in B and increases with a fall in D, but the housing in-
vestment ratio to output,
   ,
increases with a fall in B(its direction with a fall in Dbecomes ambiguous).
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Variables and Data Sources
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Variables Data Sources Notes
House prices Monthly House
Prices,
Kookmin Bank
Since the ratio of the sales to chonsei prices is not
available prior to December 1998, this variable was
extended backward using their inﬂation rates of the










Obtained by annualizing forecast values for the
next three years (twelve quarters) of inﬂation at
every quarter using the structural vector
autoregression estimation composed of two
variables, GDP and core CPI.
On
holding
1. Land: aggregate land tax, local education tax,
and city planning tax.
2. Building: property tax, local education tax, city
planning tax, and common facilities tax.
On
purchase








Capital gains tax, excessive holding land tax

















This variable was extended backward using their
inﬂation rates of house and land prices, based on
the total value of real estate estimated at the end of
1997 (2,500 trillion won: 1,548 trillion won for land




Ratio of the real estate tax revenues to the total
value of real estate
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Comment Toshiki Jinushi
Summary of the Paper
The chapter by Dr. Cho is inspired by the Korean chonseisystem and an-
alyzes the factors contributed for the divergence between its price and the
house price. The chonsei is a special type of lease contract, in which the
rentee pays the large key deposit (the chonsei price) on its beginning, pays
no regular rent afterwards, and gets the key deposit back in the end. The
rentor receives the returns on the key deposit instead of the regular rents
during the lease. In Korea, the majority of the rentee is on the chonsei
rather than the regular monthly rent contract.1 The author explains that
this system is basically the product of the imperfect mortgage markets and
the rapid urbanization in Korea.
After deriving the important arbitrage condition for the chonsei price
and the house price, the author puts the chonsei contract in the simple
growth model with some capital-market imperfections. He analyzes how
the factors, like the marginal product of the capital, the capital-market im-
perfections, and the inﬂation rate, aﬀect the ratio between the two prices.
Then, he tries to derive some lessons for monetary-policy operations from
the analysis, assuming that the monetary-policy authority cares for the
wealth distribution.
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1. Cho (2004) explains that the Korean GDP estimation needs extra steps in the imputed
rents calculation because of the prevalent chonsei system.The Arbitrage Condition
There are two arbitrage conditions, one on the house price (PH) and the




C   ,
where, the nominal interest rate is referred to as i. The second condition is
derived from the choice between the chonsei and the regular rent contract,
which means itPt
C   Rt. These two conditions imply that the relationship
between the two prices is determined as follows:
  .
This indicates that, thanks to the chonseisystem, we can estimate the ex-
pected capital gain of the house price ( H) easily from the observable vari-
ables, PH, PC, and i. This can be very useful information for both the policy-
making and the economic analysis. However, Dr. Cho focuses on another
implication of this equation. This equation shows that the ratio of the
house price over the chonsei payment would rise as the expected capital
gain of the house price rises, and that it declines as the nominal interest rate
declines as long as the expected capital gain ( H) is positive.
The Two Prices in the Growth Model with Capital-Market Imperfections
Dr. Cho constructs a simple growth model, with the house stock and
housing services, and with some capital-market imperfections. The utility
depends on the consumption of goods and the housing services, through
the Cobb-Douglas functional form. The capital stock and the housing
stock are perfect substitutes. The production function is linear with con-
stant marginal product of the capital, B. A part of the saving does not lead
to the investment because of some capital-market imperfections, whose de-
gree is denoted by D.2
Based on this model, the author derives the house price equation ﬁrst,
Pt
H   ,
where P t denotes the nominal price of the ordinary good. The house price
is higher than the ordinary good, because of the capital-market imperfec-
tions. Next, he puts the inﬂation into the model without any inﬂuences on
P t  
D
it   







(Rt   Pt
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(1   it)
[Rt   Et(PH
t 1)]
  
(1   it)
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2. D is one when the capital market is perfect. Thus, the imperfection indicates D   1.to the real variables. Then, the chonsei contract is introduced into the
model, represented by an arbitration condition, itPt
C   Rt. Because the
house stock and capital stock are perfect substitutes, the nominal value of
the rent should be equal to the nominal value of the marginal product of
the capital, so that Rt   B   P t. In the end, the nominal interest rate should
be equal to the real interest rate plus the inﬂation rate.3 The real interest
rate is equal to the marginal product of the capital discounted by the capi-
tal-market imperfections, that is, D   B. The inﬂation rate,  , is externally
chosen by the monetary authority. These considerations lead to the chon-
sei price equation
Pt
C   .
These two equations show that the ratio of the house price over the chon-
sei price rises as the marginal product of the capital, B, declines, since it
lowers the chonsei price. The ratio also rises as the capital-market imper-
fections deteriorate, D declines, since the house price rises more than the
chonsei price. The inﬂation raises this ratio as well since it lowers the chon-
sei, leaving the house price intact.
Policy Implications
Based on the above analysis, the author reaches to some intriguing pol-
icy recommendations. First, under the declining marginal product of the
capital, the monetary authority should lower the inﬂation target in order
to avoid the wealth transfer from the chonsei rentee to the house owners.
Second, the monetary-policy operation should be less active than those im-
plied by ordinary recommended policy rules like Taylor rule in order again
to avoid the wealth transfer between the house owner and the chonsei
rentee, or more broadly between the real-asset holders and the ﬁnancial-
asset holders.
Comments
The chonsei contract is fascinating. The historical and/or institutional
analysis is due to clarify its origin and evolution. I also like to see the em-
pirical analysis of its implied “capital-gain forecast” of the house prices.
This chapter is inspired by the fact that the gap between the house and
the chonsei prices is widening recently. But, the author intends to go be-
yond the mere analysis of that fact and he tries to analyze the relative price
ﬂuctuations between the real assets and the ﬁnancial assets in general. It is
a very ambitious research goal. In addition, it reaches to the quite unique
policy implications.
BP t   
(DB    )
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3. In this analysis, the author assumes that the house price moves together with the good
price, so that     H. This assumption might not reﬂect the real situation in Korea.However, I have to point out that the chapter is not dealing with the key
points in the debates about how the monetary policy should respond to the
asset-price ﬂuctuations. Since the author focuses on the case where asset-
price inﬂation is equal to the general inﬂation rate, he ignores all the issues
related to the asset-price bubbles under the mild inﬂation rate. Thus, this
chapter says almost nothing about the recent experiences in Japan.
The compact growth model with capital-market imperfections is nice by
decomposing the real interest rate into the two parts, the marginal product
of the capital and the degree of capital-market imperfections. It is under-
standable that the capital-market imperfections are introduced since they
might have generated the chonsei system itself. However, their intercon-
nection is not articulated at all. I would like to see some discussion on that
point rather than just referring to the q-theory.
On the policy recommendations of the chapter, it is notable that those 
are against the currently popular view that the monetary-policy operation
should be more aggressive facing the risk of deﬂation (see Kato and
Nishiyama 2003; and Ahearne et al. 2002). If monetary authority lowers the
target inﬂation rate under the declining marginal product of the capital, as
the chapter recommends, the risk of hitting the zero bound of the nominal
interest rate gets higher. In addition, the less active policy operation is called
for by the chapter in order to avoid the wealth transfer between the real-
asset and the nominal-asset holders. If the central bank follows those rec-
ommendations, the risk of the deﬂation might loom up. Though that kind
of transfer is serious in Korea since the total balance of the chonsei deposit
is huge, the deﬂation spiral would be the more dreadful nightmare.
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Fig. 9C.1 Korean CPI inﬂation: the general index and the housing indexIn the end, I agree with another commenter that the chonsei prices are
kept low recently in Korea because of the market expectations and condi-
tions. In particular, a casual look at the Korean CPI shows that the hous-
ing part of the CPI inﬂation is declining recently although the general CPI
inﬂation is picking up (ﬁg. 9C.1). This seems to show the weak market con-
dition for the rental housing under the strong capital gain expectation
about the housing price.
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Comment Mario B. Lamberte
Summary
In this chapter the author observes in recent years a divergence in rela-
tive housing prices (i.e., the ratio of sales price of a house to house rental
or chonsei prices). Then, the author goes on to identify factors that could
explain such a divergence by ﬁrst developing a partial equilibrium model
in which inﬂation rate, real interest rate, and rent are exogenously deter-
mined. This model produces equation (2), which clearly shows that the rel-
ative housing price is determined not by inﬂation rate alone but by the ra-
tio of inﬂation rate and real interest rate. What is interesting in this result
is that even if inﬂation rate, which can be the monetary authorities’ target,
remains the same, the real interest rate could decline, thereby raising the
price of house relative to price of chonsei.
Then, the author goes on to develop a general equilibrium model that al-
lows inﬂation rate, real interest rate, and house rent to be endogenously
determined. The results shown in equations (8-1) to (8-4) and equation (9)
yield important insights. First, the relative price of consumption good to
capital (or house) is determined by the parameter D, (D   1), which is a
measure of capital-market eﬃciency. Second, real interest rate is deter-
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production function. A decrease in either D or B or both can lead to re-
duction in real interest rate. Third, the opportunity cost of owning a house
is equal to the rent and capital gains derived from the house. And fourth,
the price of chonsei contract is determined by the parameters B and D, in-
ﬂation rate, and the price of consumption goods. In this model, one has to
trace the source of the decline in real interest rate because it will have a
diﬀerent impact on the relative prices of house (or capital) and chonsei.For
instance, a reduction in real interest rate caused by a decline in B will have
no impact on the price of house (or capital) but will aﬀect the price of chon-
sei in the same direction. However, if the reduction in real interest rate
comes from D, then both prices rise, other things being equal; however, the
former rises more than the latter.
Finally, the author develops a monetary rule that takes into account the
objective of minimizing ﬂuctuations of the relative prices of house and
chonsei,or more generally, the relative values between real and ﬁnancial as-
sets. The results shown in equation (12) suggest that monetary authorities
concerned with the relative asset prices should react to output ﬂuctuations
less actively than they should by just using the traditional Taylor rule.
Comments
1. In most countries, the housing rental contract involves the amount of
monthly rental and security deposit (typically equivalent to one month).1
The housing rental contract in Korea, however, is entirely diﬀerent. Under
the chonseisystem, a renter pays a lump-sum deposit for the entire lease pe-
riod and gets back this deposit at the end of the contract period. However,
interest earned from such deposit accrues to the homeowner, which in
eﬀect is his rental income. Given the uniqueness of this contract, I suggest
that the author provides more information about this system, including its
origin, legal framework, and tax incentives. Housing-market analysts and
observers would certainly want to understand why it exists only in Korea
and why some people choose it over straight purchase of a house.
2. I suggest that the author indicates which interest rate is used in ﬁgure
9.4 in the same manner for ﬁgure 9.3B.
3. The author was motivated by the growing divergence of house price
and chonsei price in recent years, as shown in ﬁgures 9.1A and 9.1B, which
was brought about mainly by the continuing rise of house price and a ﬂat
growth rate in chonsei price. The result of the author’s model, speciﬁcally
equation (2), predicts that as long as the real interest rate declines faster
than the inﬂation rate, then the price of house relative to chonsei will in-
crease, which indeed is borne out by the data in recent years. However, one
has to look much further back to see if the result predicted by the model is
robust. This can be done by looking at ﬁgures 9.3A to 9.3C. As shown, de-
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1. Sometimes, landlord asks for one or two months advance in rental.spite the decline in real interest rate and expected inﬂation rate in the 1990s,
the ratio of house price to chonsei price continued to decline, which con-
tradicts the prediction of the model.
4. This brings us to an important point; that is, the behavior of relative
prices in recent years could have been aﬀected by other factors. Consider
this: when real interest rates decline to a certain level, it would make it at-
tractive for households to buy their own house by borrowing from a bank
rather than by continuing to rent an apartment or house. Given the vastly
improved condition of the Korean banking system in recent years after
KAMCO successfully cleaned up their bad debts, banks could have started
providing mortgage loans, which could have explained the construction
boom Korea experienced in recent years. At the end of 2002, the average
NPL ratio of commercial banks stood at 1.9 percent, which was even lower
than the pre-crisis level of 3.9 percent. If the banking system had indeed re-
sumed lending in recent years after cleaning up their NPLs, then they
might have been looking for low-risk borrowers with good collateral that
will not require huge provisioning. Obviously, banks would favor those
who borrow to purchase a house than those borrow to rent a house ac-
cording to the chonsei contract. Landlords could have reacted by freezing
the chonsei price so as not to lose their customers.
5. I have some misgivings about asking monetary authorities to be con-
cerned about relative prices. They already have problems choosing which
price index to monitor to calibrate their monetary policy. One of the au-
thor’s rationale for including the relative asset prices in the Taylor rule is
that uncertainty about the relative asset prices will likely shrink ﬁnancial
transactions and economic activity. It is not clear if this is the case. What is
clear, though, from the Korean data is that the increase in relative prices
between house and chonsei price in recent years has been associated with a
construction boom. The other rationale put forward by the author is that
the wealth redistribution between real asset holders and ﬁnancial asset
holders itself incurs a cost to society. I think this issue can be better ad-
dressed by ﬁscal policy rather than by monetary policy.
6. The parameters B and D play a crucial role in the model. The author
in fact noted that the marginal productivity of capital in Korea has been
declining, and this decline is associated with declining real interest rate. In
this situation, if the monetary authorities are concerned with ﬂuctuations
in relative prices, then they should also lower the target for the inﬂation
rate. Granting that B has changed over time, then I must also ask if D has
changed over time, which the author has not touched upon. Given B, the
only case in which real interest would decline is when D decreases. How-
ever, I suspect that with liberalization and deepening of the Korean ﬁnan-
cial system, D could have also improved, which could lead to a reduction
in relative prices. So, policies aimed at improving capital-market eﬃciency
will have beneﬁcial impacts on relative prices.
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